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The Brezhnev Doctrinet
The Charter of the United Nations foresees the development and appli-
cation of international law solely in accordance with its provisions.' Noth-
ing has demonstrated the futility of such expectations as clearly as an
address before the Polish Communist Party Congress on November
12,1968 in which Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev enunciated the
doctrine that has come to bear his name.
Most of his speech was devoted to past accomplishments of commu-
nism, exhortations for the future, and criticisms of the West. Near the end
he began to discuss the concept of sovereignty as it applies to socialist
countries:
The socialist states stand for strict respect for the sovereignty of all coun-
tries. We emphatically oppose interference in the affairs of any states, viola-
tions of its sovereignty.
At the same time the establishment and defense of the sovereignty of states
that have embarked upon the road of building socialism is of particular signifi-
cance for us communists. The forces of imperialism and reaction seek to
deprive the people of this or that socialist country of the sovereign right they
have gained to insure the prosperity of their country, the well-being and
happiness of society, free from any oppression and exploitation [sentence as
received] and when encroachments of this right encounter a righteous rebuff by
the socialist camp, bourgeois propagandists raise a clamor over 'defense of
sovereignty' and 'non-intervention.' It is clear that this is utter fraud and
demagogy on their part.
In reality, these shouters do not care for the maintena ace of socialist sover-
eignty but for its destruction.
It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union has done much for the real
strengthening of the sovereignty and independence of the socialist countries.
The CPSU has always advocated that each socialist country determine the
specific form of its development along the road of socialism with consideration
for the specific condition of its nationals.
However, it is known, comrades, that there also are common laws governing
socialist construction, a deviation from which might lead to a deviation from
socialism as such.
*J.D., Georgetown Univ. Law Center (1970).
tThis paper was awarded first place in the 1970 Henry C. Morris International Law
Essay Contest.
'See Article 13: "The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommenda-
tions for the purpose of (a) promoting international cooperation in the political field and
encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification."
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And when the internal [emphasis supplied] and external forces hostile to
socialism seek to halt the development of any socialist country and restore the
capitalist order, when a threat to the cause of socialism in that country, or a
threat to the security of the socialist community as a whole emerges, this is no
longer only a problem of the people of that country but also a common
problem, concern for all socialist countries.
It goes without saying that such an action as military aid to a fraternal
country to cut short the threat to the socialist order is an extraordinary
enforced step, it can be sparked only by the direct actions of the enemies of
socialism inside the country and beyond its boundaries, actions creating a
threat to the common interest of the socialist camp. 2
The Brezhnev Doctrine and International Law3
Brezhnev's speech before the Polish Communist Party Congress was
directly foreshadowed by an article published in Pravda on September 25,
1968, entitled "Sovereignty and International Duties of Socialist Coun-
tries." In it, S. Kovalev, a Pravda staff specialist on propaganda, formu-
lated a theory of sovereignty based on socialist international law to rebut
the -
assertions, held in some places, that the actions of the five socialist countries
run counter to the Marxist-Leninist principle of sovereignty and the rights of
nations to self-determination.
The groundlessness of such reasoning consists primarily in that it is based on
an abstract, non-class approach to the question of sovereignty and the rights of
nations to self-determination.
4
After repeating the Marxist-Leninist principle that the world is split into
two opposing social systems-capitalism and socialism-and quoting Le-
nin: "Each man must choose between joining our side or the other side,"
Kovalev continued:
Naturally the communists of the fraternal countries could not allow the
socialist states to be inactive in the name of an abstractly understood sover-
eignty when they saw that the country stood in peril of anti-socialist degenera-
tion.... Formal observance of the freedom of self-determination of a nation in
the concrete situation that arose in Czechoslovakia would mean freedom of
"self-determination" not of the popular masses, the working people, but of
their enemies.
5
The theory was then unveiled in its entirety:
Those who speak about the 'illegal actions' of the allied socialist countries in
Czechoslovakia forget that in a class society there are not and there cannot be
non-class laws.
Laws and legal norms are subjected to the laws of the class struggle, the
2Moscow Tass International Service in English, Nov. 12, 1968.3The applicability of the United Nations Charter is discussed hereunder.4Pravda, Sept. 26,1968.51d.
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laws of social development. These laws are clearly formulated in the Marx-
ist-Leninist teaching, in the documents jointly adopted by the Communist and
Workers' Parties.
Formal juridical reasoning must not overshadow a class approach to the
matter. In doing so, one loses the only correct class criterion in assessing legal
norms, and begins to measure events with the yardstick of bourgeois law.6
Thus, insofar as they appear to conflict with the "laws of social devel-
opment," Kovalev rejected principles of international law which had gener-
ally been accepted by all nations, including those in the socialist bloc, at
least until September, 1968. 7
Did Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, as an "ante facto" exercise
of the Brezhnev Doctrine, provide the occasion for such a conflict? By
basing their right of intervention solely on the principles of Marxism, both
Kovalev and Brezhnev implied that the international law of the rest of the
world ("bourgeois law") propounds an absolute theory of sovereignty.
Intervention, however, is permitted under certain extraordinary circum-
stances:
Intervention being a violation of another state's independence, was recognized
to be in principle contrary to international law, so that any act of intervention
had to be justified as a legitimate case of reprisal, protection of nationals
abroad, or self defense or, alternatively, as authorized under a treaty with the
state concerned. 8
Neither the 1957 and 1960 Resolutions, nor any of the treaties govern-
ing relations among communist states, give the Soviet Union the right to
intervene. 9 Reprisals and protection of nationals abroad played no part in
Czechoslovakia, nor are they likely to in future applications of the Brezh-
nev Doctrine. Self-defense remains the only possibility. In an article pub-
lished in the December-1968 issue of Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo
(Soviet State and Law), 0. Irinin and F. Nikolaev seemed to draw in-
61d.7 0n October 3, 1968, Foreign Minister Gromyko spoke before the United Nations. He
emphasized that "the Soviet Union considers it necessary to state, from this tribune too, that
the socialist states cannot and will not allow the kind of situation in which the vital interests
of socialism are infringed upon [or] encroachments are made upon the inviolability of the
frontiers of the socialist commonwealth and so ipso facto upon the foundations of in-
ternational peace."
81. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations 402 (6th ed. 1963).9 See also I. Pomelov, Razvitiye sotsializma i proletarskiy internatsionalizm (The Devel-
opment of Socialism and Proletarian Internationalism), Kommunist, I, 1957 at 23. However,
the following article appeared in The Washington Post on March 21, 1970:
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union yesterday initialed a new treaty of friendship and
mutual assistance replacing a 1943 pact.
Officials said details of the new treaty would be made public after the formal signing in
May. Westerners speculated that the new pact would ratify the protectorate status forced on
Czechoslovakia by the Soviet-led invasion in 1968. Assuming the speculation were true, such
a treaty would raise new problems which are beyond the scope of this memorandum.
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spiration from the last paragraph of Brezhnev's speech, and attempted to
link Czechoslovakia to West Germany:
The Bonn ruling circles felt that weakening the defense system of socialist
nations by the removal of Czechoslovakia would lead to changes in the balance
of power in Europe to the benefit of imperialism and then throughout the
world. In turn this would have opened rosy prospects to Bonn for re-examining
the results of the past war and redrawing the borders established after it ended.
All these plans and calculations of the revanchist circles shrank before the
direct danger of a new war. 10
Even accepting the version detailed above, any action in Czechoslovakia
would have had to satisfy two requirements to be called self-defense. First,
proportionality: The reaction must be commensurate with the initial
action. The Soviet Union might have been able to defend its use of force
on the grounds that Czechoslovakia posed a military threat. Second, the
need for self-defense must be "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of
means and no moment for deliberation."
11
Nothing can disguise the essential fact that Moscow had known about
the changes in Prague since they were instituted-a much longer period of
time than an "instant." Presumably, the same would hold true for devel-
opments in any other socialist country. Without radical changes, therefore,
the concept of self-defense would not provide the needed justification for
either Czechoslovakia or the Brezhnev Doctrine in general.
The Soviet Union seemed to prefer a new definition of "intervention."
Kovalev hinted as much in one section of his article which discusses
Czechoslovakia:
Socialism, by delivering a nation from the shackles of an exploiting regime,
solves fundamental problems in the national development of any country that
has embarked upon the socialist road. On the other hand, by encroaching upon
the mainstays of socialism, the counter-revolutionary elements in Czecho-
slovakia undermined the very foundations of the country's independence and
sovereignty.'2
In other words, not "intervention," "dictatorial interference in the do-
mestic or foreign affairs of another state which impairs that state's in-
dependence"' 13 but an act of friendship and cooperation to preserve in-
dependence.
More than six months after the invasion of Czechoslovakia the Soviet
Union seemed to be attempting such a course of action. On February 26,
1969, it submitted a draft of a definition of aggression to the U.N. Special
Committee on Defining Aggression:
"
0See pp. 3-9.
"'Supra note 8, at 406.
12Supra note 4.
13R. Clark, Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine, Government Printing Office (1929).
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[Aggression is]... the invasion by the armed forces of a state against the
territory of another state... military occupation of another state. [But in accor-
dance with the Brezhnev Doctrine] encroachment by one state on another's
social and political achievements is aggression only when it involves states
with different social systems.
14
Nevertheless, the strongest and most recent evidence seems to indicate
the absence of any genuine desire to justify the Brezhnev Doctrine in terms
of traditional international law. It was not even mentioned in an article in
the February 1969 issue of Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo (Soviet State
and Law) entitled 0 nekotoryx tendentsyiax razvitiya universal'noqo mez-
hdunarodnogo prava (Some Trends in the Development of a Universal
International Law).15
The Monroe Doctrine and the Dominican Crisis of 1965
Any mention of the Brezhnev Doctrine almost immediately recalls the
Monroe Doctrine and the Dominican Crisis of 1965. Not that the Soviet
Union ever used them to justify its actions, let alone recognized their
validity. Thus, in 1960 at a news conference, a Russian reporter asked
Khrushchev to discuss the Monroe Doctrine. He replied; "We consider
that it has outlived its time... has died, so to speak, a natural death. Now it
is well for the remains of this doctrine to be buried like any dead body so
that it cannot poison the air as it decays." As for the Dominican Crisis, the
Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations made the following statement:
By engaging in this criminal invasion of the territory of another country with
the aim of interfering in its domestic affairs, the United States is flagrantly
violating the United Nations Charter and in particular the provisions of Article
2, paragraph 4, which reads: 'All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the purposes of the United Nations.' The United States has also violated
Article 2, paragraph 7, of the United Nations Charter... 16
However, the Monroe Doctrine and the Dominican Crisis of 1965 merit
discussion, because some tend to equate them with the Brezhnev Doctrine
and because they serve as an ideal backdrop for the latter.
A. The Monroe Doctrine
Like the Brezhnev Doctrine, the Monroe Doctrine was originally only a
portion of a speech:
The occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which
14N.Y. Daily Post, Mar. 1, 1969.
15The Soviet Union does not employ the term "Brezhnev Doctrine." What was lacking
in the article was any reference to the concept of limited sovereignty.
1620 U.N. SCOR, I 196th Meeting I 1-18 (1965).
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the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American
continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed
and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for further
colonization by an European power... In the wars of the European powers, in
matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it
comport with our policy to do so... We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the
amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to
declare that we should consider an attempt on their part to extend their system
to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With
the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not
interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have de-
clared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have,
on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view
any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any
other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as
the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. 17
Almost a hundred years later, it was modified by the Roosevelt Corol-
lary. Financial mismanagement in the Dominican Republic had increased
the likelihood of intervention by European creditor nations. Hoping to
remove any ground for them to act, President Theodore Roosevelt stated
in his annual message to Congress on December 6, 1904:
Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our
hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable
efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays
its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic
wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of
civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention
by some civilized nations, and in the Western Hemisphere, the adherence of
the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States,
however reluctantly, in cases of wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of
the international police power... If within their borders the reign of law and
order obtains, prosperity is sure to come to them. While they thus obey the
primary laws of civilized society they may rest assured that they will be treated
by us in a spirit of cordial and helpful sympathy. We would interfere with them
only in the last resort, and then only if it became evident that their inability or
unwillingness to do justice at home and abroad had violated the rights of the
United States or had invited foreign aggression to the entire body of American
nations.18
While the Roosevelt Corollary soon provided an excuse for United
States intervention in Latin America, it did not necessarily violate in-
ternational law. As early as 1861, the British Minister to Mexico had
replied to the denunciation by the United States of foreign intervention to
compel payment of debts: "If the position of the United States... is main-
tained, I cannot but view it as binding that country to assume the moral
obligation toward other nations of restoring peace and order in Mexico,
172 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents 207-220.
18H.R. Doc. No. I, 58th Cong., 3d Sess. 412 (1904).
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and of preventing scenes which disgrace humanity and neutralize... the
international rights and commercial relations of civilized nations."'19
By 1929 the United States had begun to re-evaluate the Roosevelt
Corollary. Reuben Clark, Under Secretary of State during the Hoover
administration, wrote:
The so-called Roosevelt Corollary was to the effect.., that in case of
financial or other difficulties in weak Latin American countries, the United
States should attempt an adjustment thereof lest European governments should
intervene, and in intervening should occupy territory-an act which would be
contrary to the Monroe Doctrine... It is believed that this corollary is notjustified by the terms of the Monroe Doctrine, however much it may bejustified by the application of the doctrine of self-preservation. 20
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt unequivocally abandoned the Cor-
ollary in the Good Neighbor Policy. In the Buenos Aires Convention of
1936:
The High Contracting Parties declare[d] inadmissible the intervention of any
one of them, directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the internal or
external affairs of any of the parties. The violation of the provisions of this
article [was to] give rise to mutual consultation with the object of exchanging
and seeking methods of peaceful adjustment.
Monroe set forth his Doctrine 147 years ago. During that time it has
been defined and redefined, used and abused, until objective interpretation
became difficult if not impossible. But even a cursory examination of the
wording reveals the fundamental differences between it and the Brezhnev
Doctrine. The former is a policy of self-defense applied solely to European
attacks upon the Western Hemisphere which might endanger the security
of the United States. It does not discuss the relations among the American
states. Reuben Clark emphasized this:
The Doctrine does not concern itself with purely inter-American relations; it
has nothing to do with the relationship between the United States and other
American nations, except where other nations shall become involved with
European governments in arrangements which threaten the security of the
United States... The fact should never be lost to view that in applying this
Doctrine ... our government has over and over again driven it as a shield
between Europe and the Americas to protect Latin America from the political
and territorial thrusts of Europe; -:d this was done at times when ... the
political morality of Europe sanctioned, indeed encouraged, the acquisition of
territory by force. 21
The Brezhnev Doctrine, on the other hand, gives the Soviet Union the
rights to intervene "when the internal [emphasis supplied] and external
forces hostile to socialism seek to halt the development of any socialist
"
9See H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 100, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-17, 22, 187-90 (1861);
Department of State: Instructions to Great Britain 138-40 (1862).20Supra note 13.21Supra note 13.
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country and restore the capitalist order, when a threat to the cause of
socialism in that country or a threat to the security of the socialist commu-
nity as a whole emerges." '22
B. The Dominican Crisis of 1965
At first glance American intervention in the Dominican Republic in
1965 seems indistinguishable from the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
in 1968. Both actions were largely unilateral, although each country suc-
ceeded in obtaining token forces from other countries. Nevertheless, there
are several crucial distinctions.
First, the Soviet Union dispatched more than 500,000 soldiers com-
pared with 14,000 by the United States. Second, the United States per-
mitted United Nations observers. Third, the lives of American citizens and
other foreign nationals may have been in danger. Fourth, American aid was
requested. No government official could be found in Czechoslovakia who
could be said to have extended an invitation to the Soviet Union. If such a
distinction seems to place a premium upon the existence of a Quisling, it
should not be forgotten that in 1965 no one knew which faction represent-,
ed the real government of the Dominican Republic. Fifth, the United
States intervened to preserve "the right of all of the free people of this
hemisphere to choose their own course without falling prey to international
conspiracy from any quarter.' 23 Nor were the United States forces...
occupying the Dominican Republic. They [were] not asserting authority to
govern any part of the country. They [were] not taking sides in the civil
conflict. United States action ha[d] been taken in order to help preserve for the
people of the Dominican Republic their right to choose their government free
from outside interference.
Experience [had] shown that if a group led by communist conspirators and
inspired by an outside power [were] permitted to seize control of a country by
force, any further consideration of the right of the people of that country to
choose their own course [would have been ] an empty gesture.2 4
The United States acted to guarantee the Dominican Republic the right
to any non-communist form of government. The Soviet Union invaded
Czechoslovakia in the absence of a civil conflict to enforce a form of
government which the people of Czechoslovakia wished to change.
Sixth, and most important of all, the Organization of American States
played an important role. Intervention in Latin America had been elimi-
nated only by a nation acting unilaterally. Article 19 of the OAS Charter
declares that "Measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and secur-
22Supra note 2.
1965-1 Johnson, Public Papers of the President of the United States 461.
'Opinion of Legal Advisor of Department of State, Legal Basis for United States
Actions in the Dominican Republic, May 7, 1965.
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ity in accordance with existing treaties do not constitute a violation..."
And the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance permits the use
of armed force (Article 8) in any of the situations listed in Article 6
including "any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of
America." Neither the 1957 or 1960 Resolution governing relations among
communist states nor the Warsaw Pact contains such language.
In no way then can the actions of the United States in the Dominican
Republic be construed as the exercise of a de facto Brezhnev Doctrine.
The latter is unique.
The United Nations
Since the Brezhnev Doctrine permits the use of force, it violates Article
2, Paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.
In the event of a conflict between a principle of international law and the
Charter, the latter controls. 25 Thus, the Brezhnev Doctrine is illegal.
Article 2, Paragraph 7 is also pertinent:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement
under the present. Charter.
What the United Nations could not do acting collectively, would be
forbidden a fortiori to individual nations.
Nor does Article 51 on self-defense provide a basis. Only "armed
attack" is specifically mentioned, which would hardly encompass ideologi-
cal dangers.
Under Soviet pressure, the Czechoslovak government asked the Secur-
ity Council not to take up the legality of the invasion. The First Moscow
Communiqu6 of August 27, 1968 contained the following language: "In
connection with the discussion in the United Nations Security Council of
the so-called question of the situation in Czechoslovakia, the representa-
tives of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic stated that the Czechoslovak
side had not requested the submission of the question for consideration by
the Security Council and demanded its removal from the agenda." '26
No other member nation since then has called for a discussion of
2See Article 104. While only obligations under "any other international agreements" are
mentioned, clearly customary international law must also yield to the Charter.26 Moscow News, Aug. 31, 1968.
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Czechoslovakia or the Brezhnev Doctrine by the United Nations. Only the
U.N. Special Committee on Principles of International Law raised doubts
as to the legality of both.
The Warsaw Pact
Soviet commentators have not attempted to base the Brezhnev Doctrine
on the Warsaw Pact or any of the bilateral agreements between the
USSR and Eastern European nations. Regardless of their contents,
however, Article 53 of the U.N. Charter controls all "Regional Arrange-
ments." Paragraph I states that "Nothing in the present Charter precludes
the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such
matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as
are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or
agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Prin-
ciples of the United Nations." Since the Brezhnev Doctrine has already
been found to violate these principles, it cannot be validated by any other
treaty or arrangement.
Even if the Charter contained no prohibitions against the Russian in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia, the very terms of the bilateral agreements and
the Warsaw Pact preclude any violation of the sovereignty of socialist
nations. Thus, the Agreement of Mutual Assistance signed in December,
1943, and renewed in December, 1963, between the Soviet Union and
Czechoslovakia does not even provide a firm juridical basis for the station-
ing of Soviet troops on the territory of a treaty partner.2 7 While the
Warsaw Pact does establish United Armed Forces and takes the first steps
toward regularizing the status of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe,2 8 two
provisions forbid the type of intervention contemplated by Briezhnev:
The Contracting Parties undertake, in accordance with the Charter of tne
United Nations Organization, to refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force, and to settle their international disputes peacefully and in
such manner as will not jeopardize international peace and security. [Article I]
The Contracting Parties declare that they will act in a spirit of friendship and
cooperation with a view to further developing and fostering economic and
cultural intercourse with one another, each adhering to the principle of respect
for the independence and sovereignty of the others and non-interference in
their internal affairs. [Article 8]29
Only Article 4 foresees the limited use of force:
27See note 9.28
"The disposition of the Joint Armed Forces in the territories of the signatory states will
be effected by agreement among the states, in accordance with the requirements of their
mutual defense." Such an agreement was signed on October 16, 1968 between the Soviet
Union and Czechoslovakia and ratified by the Soviet Praesidium and Czechoslovak Assembly
on October 18, 1968.
29The entire treaty was set out in 21 New Times, May 21, 1955 (Moscow).
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In the event of armed attack... on one or more of the Parties to the
Treaty ... each of the Parties to the Treaty, in the exercise of its right to
individual or collective self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations Organization, shall immediately, either in-
dividually or in agreement with other Parties to the Treaty, come to the
assistance of the state or states attacked with all such means as it deems
necessary, including armed force. 30
Conclusion
No discussion of the Brezhnev Doctrine would be complete without a
brief examination of the extent and likelihood of its application. To what
countries might it extend? Apparently, Moscow claims "the right to in-
tervene anywhere in a socialist world, including fourteen states from Cuba
to Mongolia and embracing several like China, Yugoslavia, and Albania." 3'
Gromyko also declared that the Middle East crisis was "in an area directly
bordering on our southern frontiers," and "directly [concerned] ... the
security of the Soviet Union."'32 The possibility, thus, arises of an even
broader application. An article in Pravda cautioned that:
formal, legal considerations cannot be allowed to violate the class approach.
Whoever permits this, thereby depriving himself of the only true class criterion,
begins to measure events with the yardstick of bourgeois law. This kind of
approach to the question of sovereignty implies, for example, that the world's
progressive forces could not protest against the emergence of neo-Nazism in
the Federal German Republic, against the butcherly Franco and Salazar,
against the reactionary deeds of the "black colonels" in Greece, because these
are "internal affairs" of "sovereign states."33
Will the Doctrine be applied? In the year and a half since it was first
propounded, it remains an unrealized threat repeatedly employed by the
Soviet Union and as often assailed by Western diplomats and officials of
the communist parties of Eastern and Western Europe. Nevertheless, such
a time interval may have little meaning; twelve years separated Hungary
and Czechoslovakia.
"Limited sovereignty" is only a "legal" justification for action, not a
reason. Thus, whether the Brezhnev Doctrine will be used depends upon
such extra-legal factors as geographic proximity, the availability of other
methods, the importance of the Soviet interest involved, the current state
of Sino-Soviet relations, and perhaps, the forcefulness with which the rest
of the world expresses its disapproval of, and manifests its determination to
resist, any intervention.
301d.31Sulzberger, Foreign Affairs: To Have and Have Not, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1968.32 lzvestia, Sept 5, 1968.33Pravda, Sept. 26, 1968.
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